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ABSTRACT
Neoclassical theory has been misrepresented in the segmented economy
literature. Consequently, most tests of "structural" vs. "neoclassical"
models are inadequate. Moreover, segmented economy theorists have
concentrated on the least significant departures of segmented models from
neoclassical economics. In fact, neoclassical economists have developed
elements of a segmented labor market model which is similar to the
segmented economy theories. We sketch this model and argue that the
neoclassical model gives a precise meaning to the concept of dual or
segmented labor markets but does not suggest that a classification system
for job characteristics must rely on a single dimension.
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Segmented labor market models gained popularity in economics during
the late 1960s and early l970s but fell fairly rapidly into disrepute
following criticisms by Wachter (1974) and Cain (1976). At about this
time, sociologists, drawing on the work of Averitt (1968) of segmented
labor market theorists, developed a theory of a dual or segmented
economy.* The sociological theory is portrayed as corrective of the
labor-supply-side and individualistic orientation of human capital and
status attainment theory.
In this paper, we argue that neoclassical theory has been
misrepresented in the literature on segmented economy and that tests
designed to distinguish between "structural" and "neoclassical" models are
inadequate for that task. Moreover, we maintain that dual labor market
and dual economy theorists have concentrated on the aspects of the theory
which represent the least significant departure from neoclassical
economics. In fact, following a research heuristic of their own,
neoclassical economists have developed elements of a segmented labor
market model which is in many ways similar to the segmented economy
theories found in sociology. We sketch this model and argue that the
neoclassical model gives a precise meaning to the concept of dual or
segmented labor markets but does not suggest that a classification system
for job characteristics must rely on a single dimension.2
II. Neoclassical Wage Determination*
Sociological critics (e.g. Berg, 1981; Bibb & Form, 1977; Horan, Beck
& Tolbert, 1980; Sorenson & Kalleberg, 1981) have sometimes characterized
the neoclassical model of wage determination as supply driven. According
to this view, neoclassical economics ascribes productivity to the worker
rather than to the job or to some combination of job and worker. Wage
differences are said to be explained by individual characteristics rather
than by the characteristics of the jobs the individuals hold. From this
perspective, dual economy and dual labor market theory are perceived as
reminding economists of their long-standing interest in demand as well as
supply.
While these critics are certainly correct in their view that
economists have paid excessive attention to the human capital model of
earnings determination, neoclassical economists have developed quite
sophisticated models in which individuals' productivities vary according
to their job and have concerned themselves with the process whereby
workers and jobs are matched. In developing such models, neoclassical
economists clearly take account of both supply and demand. It is no more
surprising to the neoclassical labor economist than to the dual labor
market theorist that their graduate students will earn more as
professional economists in consulting firms than as dishwashers in
restaurants.3
In this section, we describe the neoclassical model of wage
determination under pure competition when there is perfect information and
when jobs and workers are heterogeneous. The model has a fairly extensive
modern history; even if we ignore the obligatory reference to Adam Smith,
the essentials of the model were developed in the early 1950s (Roy, 1950,
1951; Tinbergen, 1951, 1956). More recent work (Heckman & Sedlacek, 1985;
Rosen, 1974; Sattinger, 1979, 1980; Thaler & Rosen, 1975) has built on
this tradition.
In this model, the wage paid to workers in any particular job will
depend on personal attributes which affect productivity and on
characteristics of the job which affect its desirability. The relation
between personal attributes and wages varies among jobs. Since
information is assumed to be perfect, workers know what wage they will
receive in any job if they have a certain combination of attributes and
the job has a particular combination of characteristics. Certain
attributes (e.g height) are, of course, not easily altered, but others
such as education are somewhat under the control of the individual. It is
these personal attributes and job characteristics which are the primary
subject of economic analysis.
Let us consider an individual's decision about how much education to
obtain. Since education is costly, individuals require higher earnings in
order to compensate them for obtaining additional education. Figure 1
shows "indifference curves" for two different workers. The indifference
curves represent combinations of schooling and earnings which leave that
worker equally well off. Indifference curves which are higher and to the4
left are preferred since they represent higher earnings for a constant
level of education (or the same earnings for less education). Of course,
individuals care about aspects of a job other than the education it
requires and the wages it pays. A myriad of factors such as location,
safety, and job pace affect the way workers view jobs. Those readers who
feel comfortable imagining tangencies of n-dimensional surfaces are
encouraged to recognize the immediate applicability to the more general
problem. For simplicity, we consider the case where jobs and workers have
only two characteristics which for purposes of concreteness we term wages
and education.
Figure 1 also shows the combinations of wages and schooling which are
available to the individuals. Each individual chooses the point along the
wage/schooling locus (or hedonic wage equation) which puts him or her on
the highest indifference curve. By comparing the slopes of the two sets
of indifference curves at points at which they are depicted as crossing,
it can be seen that individual B requires less compensation for obtaining
education than does individual A. This may reflect any of several
possibilities For example, perhaps B enjoys education more or has more
financial resources with which to finance education, and therefore,
relative to A, chooses a combination of wages and schooling which involves
higher wages and more schooling.
Figure 2 shows a similar decision for two different firms for a
particular type of job. In each firm, workers' productivities depend on
how much education they have received. However, education contributes
more to productivity in firm B than in firm A. Figure 2 shows isoprofit5
curves for each firm, representing combinations of wages and education
which leave the firm with the same profit. Isoprof it curves are more
desirable to the firm as one moves down and to the right, representing
combinations involving more education and lower wages. Firms have a
decision problem which is analogous to that of workers. They recognize
that they must pay higher wages in order to get workers with higher levels
of education. Firms in which education increases productivity to a
greater extent will be willing to spend more on hiring more educated
workers. They choose the wage/education combination given by the point
along the hedonic wage equation (EWE) which is just tangent to the
isoprofit curve, representing the highest level of profit attainable by
the firm.
The final element of the theory is the determination of the HWE. The
EWE adjusts until the number of workers with each level of education is
exactly equal to the number demanded. The result, shown in figure 3, is
that firms in which education is particularly valuable are matched with
workers who require relatively little compensation for getting education.
The HWE represents the market relation between education and wages.*
The EWE is a standard wage equation of the type estimated in human
capital models. We have derived it using a human capital theoretic
explanation of the role of education which assumes that education
increases productivity. However, we could equally have assumed that
education serves as a signal of innate ability and that innate ability is
more valuable in certain jobs than in others. The human capital
interpretation is not essential to the model. In the light of6
sociological critiques of the human capital model, it is, however,
important to note that the wage equation does not ignore "demand"
factors. Instead the HWE is the market equilibrium locus resulting from
the joint action of supply and demand when workers and jobs are
heterogeneous. In fact, given the manner in which the model has been
developed, it is not evident whether education should be considered a
characteristic of the worker or of the job. It is, in fact, neither or
both, depending on one's semantic choice, since it is a characteristic of
the worker/job match.*
In particular, this model does not ignore marginal productivity
theory. However, the theory's assumptions are hidden in the equilibrium
requirement that the quantity supplied equal the quantity demanded, Firms
simultaneously choose the number of workers to hire and the level of
education. In equilibrium, the number of workers hired by the firm will
be such that the wage exactly equals the value of the marginal product of
the type of worker hired.
There are several limitations to the model which should be noted. In
particular, it is a model of a perfectly competitive labor market. Thus
it ignores the role of unions and monopsony.** Economists have
generally used quite different models to describe wage setting in the
presence of unions and do not apply the competitive model described here.
In addition, the model assumes perfect information which makes the
assumption of perfect matching of workers and firms sensible. More
realistically, the matching process should be modeled as one involving
search and imperfect, costly information. However, it seems unlikely that7
allowing for search would alter the model significantly. A model can be
constructed in which at each level of education, there is a distribution
of wages available. In this model, when choosing their level of
education, workers maximize their expected net wage (or expected utility)
given optimal search behavior. Workers with low costs of schooling get
more education, set higher reservation wages, and tend to end up in firms
in which education contributes significantly to productivity. Thus while
the matching process in a search model is not perfect, the broad outlines
of the perfect information model continue to hold.
Simple search theory (dating at least from Stigler's (1962) seminal
piece) allows workers to receive different wages for the same job; the
extension to heterogeneous jobs is obvious, Models in which there is
uncertainty about the quality of the job match have also been incorporated
into the economic model (Jovanovic, 1979a&b). It should, therefore, be
evident from this description that the major departure of dual labor
market theory from neoclassical theory is not that workers receive
different wages depending on the job they obtain. There are, however,
significant differences between the neoclassical and dual labor market
models. These are addressed in the next section.
III. The Challenge of Segmented Labor Market Theories to Orthodox Theory
Aside from a difference of methodology which has been emphasized by
Woodbury (1979) and Piore (1983), the dual labor market models of the late
1960s and early 1970s departed from the standard neoclassical model in
three significant ways.First, they introduced non-price rationing for good jobs. Unlike
neoclassical labor economists, dual labor market theorists maintained that
some individuals who were qualified for and wanted certain types of jobs
at the going wage could not obtain them. In the standard economic model
such people would bid down the wages in the desired jobs until supply
equated demand -- theavailable jobs would be rationed by the price
mechanism. In addition, difficulties of access were thought by dual labor
market theorists to be systematic. Women, blacks, and other minorities
faced barriers which inhibited them from obtaining desirable jobs.
A number of authors (Bluestone, 1970; Hodson & Kaufman, 1982;
Kalleberg & Sorenson, 1979; Leigh, 1976; Rosenberg, 1980; Schiller, 1977;
Tolbert, 1982), including some dual labor market theorists, have
interpreted the view that there were two sectors of the labor market with
little or no mobility between them as a significant departure from human
capital theory. However, lack of mobility between "sectors" is fully
compatible with the neoclassical model as long as the initial worker-job
matches are optimal. Further, mobility between sectors does not
demonstrate the absence of non-price rationing.
A very simple neoclassical model in which workers acquire firm,
occupation, industry or sector specific skills is consistent with no
mobility whatsoever between firms, occupations, industries or sectors,
respectively. Of course, more realistic models allow for some mobility,
but limited mobility is a direct consequence of the existence of such
skills. Thus much of the literature on internal labor markets and
mobility chains is fully compatible with the neoclassical model. On theQ
otherhand, if qualified blacks had to work in bad jobs for a few years
before obtaining good jobs but equally qualified whites could obtain good
jobs immediately, there would be mobility between the sectors. In fact,
we might find that blacks were more likely than whites to leave the
"secondary" sector. However, the non-price rationing of good jobs would
be inconsistent with standard models, despite the presence of mobility.
The second departure of dual labor market theories from neoclassical
theory is the argument that the same product is often produced using two
distinct technologies. While the assumptions of neoclassical economics do
not preclude the existence of multiple solutions to the firm's
maximization problem, in general, standard convexity assumptions provide
structure to neoclassical models and ensure a unique maximum.
We will argue in section V that both of these aspects of dual labor
market theory have been incorporated into neoclassical economics by recent
developments. These developments have occurred largely without explicit
reference to dual labor market theory. We conclude that they were never
really incompatible with neoclassical theory, although at the time they
were viewed as significant departures.
Instead, we agree with Piore (1974) and Wachter (1974) that the major
innovation of dual labor market theory was the attempt to make certain
social-psychological qualities endogenous to the economic system. Thus
Doeringer and Piore (1971) argue that the development of stable work
habits depends on the type of job that workers obtain. In his later work
(1980b), Piore defines labor market sectors in terms of the types of
reasoning they require and promote. Thus in the upper tier of the primary10
sector, we find a wide range of related work tasks; this enhances the
worker's ability to achieve an abstract understanding of the work and is,
thus, conducive to abstract understanding and learning. In the lower tier
of the primary sector, the range of tasks is narrower and thus supports
concrete more than abstract learning and understanding. Finally, work is
organized in the secondary sector so that understanding is not required
and, hence, inhibits abstract understanding. Dickens (1979) relates
sector of employment to Kohlberg's stages of development and to Melvin
Kohn's studies of work and personality.
It is important to note that Piore is not involved in psychological
reductionism. Although the cognitive processes developed prior to
employment, particularly in schools where training may depend on the
social stratum from which the student is drawn, affect the initial
placement of workers, the relation between job placement and cognitive
processes is seen as reciprocal. The role of labor market stratum in
determining cognitive processes is equally important. Thus the work is
not anti-sociological but instead has natural links to sociological work
on how social structure influences the way in which the individual comes
to understand his place in society, a concern which has traditions dating
at least to Marx, Durkheim and Simmel and which continues to interest
modern researchers such as Thom (1983). Indeed, the issues addressed by
Piore are also discussed in Durkheim's Division of Labor in Society.
Wachter suggests that endogenous tastes are not antithetical to
neoclassical economics. We see little value in an extended debate on the
philosophy of economics, but it appears to us that if neoclassical11
economics has any core tenets, they are that individuals have preferences
which are exogenous to the economic system and are unchanging or only
slowly changing over time and that they use available information
efficiently to maximize their welfare given these preferences. Thus
endogenous work habits and cognitive processes represent a significant
departure from that model. It is unfortunate that this is also the aspect
of dual labor market theory that has received the least attention.
We have not discussed the internal labor market as a significant
contribution of dual labor market theory. This is in part a matter of
definition. While some of the most significant contributions to our
understanding of internal labor markets are from dual labor market
theorists (particularly, Doeringer & Piore, 1971), we perceive their work
as complementing rather than contradicting ongoing neoclassical work, a
view shared by Cain (1976). Neoclassical economists recognized that the
presence of firm-specific human capital created a bilateral monopoly with
incentives for long term employment relations but an indeterminate wage
profile over the course of that relation. Essentially any wage profile
which gave both firm and worker incentives to maintain the employment
relation and paid the (appropriately discounted) competitive wage over the
life of the relation would be consistent with neoclassical theory. The
internal labor market contribution considered how that indeterminacy is
resolved.12
IV. The Sociological Response
On the whole, the sociological literature on dual economy has not
been concerned with the issues outlined above. To a certain degree, this
reflects the fact that sociologists have drawn on a tradition derived from
Averitt's (1968) work on dual economy and have relied only loosely on the
dual labor market literature. With the possible exceptions of Bluestone
(1970) and Edwards (1975), there is general agreement that while, the core
or monopoly sector of the dual economy contains a preponderance of primary
jobs, dual economy and dual labor markets represent different sources of
division in the economy. Piore's work (l980a&b) on these linkages seems
to have been largely overlooked.
Thus the sociological literature on dual or segmented economy has
taken as its starting point the existence of monopoly rents in the core
sector. Wages in the monopoly sector may be higher because workers are
able to capture part of these rents or because monopoly firms use their
ability to pay to purchase worker cooperation. The need to assure worker
loyalty is greater in large organizations and thus purchasing loyalty
through higher wages is particularly useful in the monopoly sector. The
literature on segmented economy (Kalleberg, Althauser & Wallace, 1981)
argues that the sources of worker power are more complex than suggested by
dual economy theorists, but retains the emphasis on worker power. The
dual and segmented economy models therefore explicitly reject the
assumption of a perfectly competitive labor market which is crucial to the
neoclassical model described in the previous section. In a perfectly
competitive labor market, workers would be unable to capture rents which13
firms accrue in the product market. Moreover, "ability to pay" does not
affect wage rates in a competitive market. Employers' ability to pay is
irrelevant because competition among workers guarantees that all employers
will pay the same wage for equivalent workers in jobs that are equally
unpleasant. An employer who offered a wage below the market equilibrium
wage would be unable to hire any workers. No employer would want to pay
more (even if he or she could) since profits could be increased by paying
only the going wage.
To an economist, the dual economy approach implies that there will be
a queue (excess supply of workers) and thus non-price rationing for jobs
in the monopoly sector since wages in that sector are above their market
clearing level. Wages in the state sector are presumed to be patterned on
monopoly sector wages; consequently there should also be a queue for state
sector jobs as well. We do not wish to imply that the only prediction of
the dual economy literature is that wages are higher in the core sector.
On the contrary, the dual economy literature contains a number of
hypotheses regarding the relation between worker attributes and sector of
employment. For example, in the core sector, education is expected to
play a larger role because of the greater reliance on credentials in large
organizations. However, to a large extent these predictions can be
interpreted as either resulting from the absence of market clearing, as in
the case of discrimination (since employers can choose workers from the
excess supply who correspond to the type of worker they desire), or to be
hypotheses regarding where the firm will locate along the HWE and thus
fully compatible with the neoclassical model. Thus, on the whole, again14
economic and sociological perspectives do not conflict but rather address
different issues.
Thus from an economist's perspective the primary departure of
segmented economy theory from neoclassical theory is the rejection of
market clearing in the model of wage determination. Dual labor market
theory also rejects market clearing; however, unlike most dual labor
market models (for exceptions see Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Piore 1975),
dual economy theory provides a theoretical basis for the existence of
queues and labor market segmentation which is derived from the ability of
workers to capture monopoly rents.
On the other hand, dual economy theory has not taken up the two other
departures from neoclassical theory which we discussed in the previous
section. Unlike dual labor market theory, dual economy theory has tended
to treat entire industries as being in the core or periphery and thus has
not dealt with the use of differing technologies to produce the same
output. Also, it has not addressed the relation between cognition,
socialization and sector of employment with which dual labor market theory
has been concerned.
Although the major departure from neoclassical theory of sociological
theories of segmentation is the rejection of market clearing, the dual
economy literature has concentrated on the issue of whether
characteristics of the employer influence the wage received by the
worker. A frequent practice in the segmented economy literature has been
to test the model by regressing wages on firm and/or industry
characteristics as well as worker characteristics (Hodson, 1984;15
Kalleberg, Wallace & Althauser, 1981; Wallace & Kalleberg, 1981). The
fact that, in general, industry and/or firm characteristics enter the
equation significantly is presented as evidence contradicting the human
capital model.
There are two problems with this approach. First, the neoclassical
model of section II implies that firm or industry characteristics will
generally enter the wage equation with significant coefficients even when
worker/job match characteristics or worker attributes are included,
because inevitably not all characteristics are included and the functional
form is only approximate. Secondly, if the dual market approach is
correct, ordinary least squares is not a legitimate estimator for the wage
equation. We discuss these problems in turn.
In the neoclassical model, it is perfectly legitimate to express the
wage equation entirely in terms of worker characteristics, entirely in
terms of firm characteristics or in terms of the worker/job match as in
the HWE. To express the wage equation solely in terms of the worker's
characteristics, note that from figures 1 and 3, the level of education
the worker obtains will depend entirely on his or her attributes.
Therefore, instead of expressing wages as a function of worker/job match
characteristics, it is possible to express the wage as a function of
worker attributes. Similarly, wages can be expressed as a function of
firm attributes.* Thus, to reiterate, even if one interprets standard
wage equations as expressing the wage solely in terms of worker
attributes, it does not follow that they have ignored the importance of
"demand."16
More significantly, since the model can be expressed as a function of
any of the three types of characteristics, it is likely that when firm (or
industry) characteristics are included in the equation along with worker
characteristics that both will turn out to be significant. Since any
functional form for the wage equation is inevitably an approximation to
the "true" functional form, the error term in the wage equation with only
worker characteristics will almost definitely be correlated with firm
characteristics. Only if the wage equation were specified exactly and all
relevant worker characteristics were measured perfectly would this not be
true. Otherwise, firm or industry characteristics will be correlated with
unmeasured characteristics such as job safety or the quality of worker
hired.
Dickens and Katz (1986, 1987) address the issue of why there are
significant inter-industry wage differences. They suggest three
possibilities: 1) that the model outlined in section II is accurate but
that there are inter-industry wage differentials resulting from temporary
disequilibria, 2) that the model outlined in section II is accurate and
that inter-industry wage differentials reflect unmeasured job match
characteristics and 3) that the neoclassical model outlined in section II
is inaccurate. They provide evidence that inter-industry wage
differentials have persisted over extended periods of time and thus
conclude that the temporary disequilibrium hypothesis can be rejected.
They also marshall evidence that inter-industry differentials persist even
after careful statistical controls for a large number of job match
characteristics, and that inter-industry differentials are strongly17
correlated across occupations. Thus, they conclude that the neoclassical
the model outlined in section II is probably inaccurate.
However, as noted above, the standard neoclassical model implies that
firm or industry characteristics enter the wage equation containing
individual characteristics because they are correlated with the error
term. In contrast, the dual economy model suggests that these
characteristics belong in the equation in their own right. Therefore,
this conclusion ultimately rests either on conjectures about how large
inter-industry wage differentials can be or on auxiliary hypotheses such
as how correlated over time and across occupations and nations
inter-industry wage differentials should be. Thus including industry or
firm characteristics in the wage equation at best provides a weak test of
the neoclassical model.
Moreover, if the segmented market model is correct, it is not
legitimate to interpret the OLS coefficients of a single wage equation
with industry dunimies or characteristics as measuring the amount of
monopoly rents captured by workers. As noted above, the dual economy
hypothesis implies that there are queues for good jobs. Since there is an
excess supply of workers for these jobs, firms will choose the "best"
available workers from the queue. These workers will be those whose wages
are unusually low given their productivity. Since it is inevitable that
we do not measure all determinants of wages, the expected value of the
contribution of unmeasured characteristics to the wage (in other words,
the error term) in those jobs is negative rather than zero as required for
ordinary least squares. Thus, in general, ordinary least squares will18
overestimate the importance of industry dummies or characteristics.
This criticism is, if anything, more compelling when applied to tests
which have divided the sample into sectors and tested for the existence of
separate equations explaining the determination of wages for each sector
(Beck, iloran & Tolbert, 1978; Hodson, 1978, 1984; Horan, Beck & Tolbert,
1980; Osterman, 1975; Zucker & Rosenstein, 1981). The endogeneity of
sector of employment is particularly important because, as Cain (1976) has
pointed out, if workers are divided into two sectors, a large sector
composed mainly of workers with high wages and a small sector composed
mainly of workers with low wages, we will estimate that the returns to
education and experience are lower in the "low wage sector" even if in
fact there are not two distinct sectors, The estimated return to
education will be biased downwards In both sectors by the truncation of
the wage, but the bias will be more serious in the smaller sector since
the fraction of "missing" observations is larger. This statistical
problem can be avoided only by explicitly modeling the assignment of
workers to sectors. There is an extensive literature on consistent
estimation of models with this sort of selection problem. (see Maddala,
1983, for an excellent review.)
A second difficulty arises because, with the exception of Dickens and
Lang (1985a&b, 1986, 1987), all estimates of sectoral models assume that
the sector of employment is known. Yet as Zucker and Rosenstein (1981)
make clear, the correlations among classification schemes that divide
industries into a core and periphery sector are relatively weak, ranging
from 57% to 83% agreement for the four taxonomies they study. The degree19
of disagreement is striking when one considers that if each study had
assigned people to sectors randomly but in the same proportions as in the
actual studies, the level of agreement would have ranged from 40% to 50%.
Without doubt, part of the disagreement is due to underlying
theoretical differences. However, much of the disagreement simply
reflects the difficulties entailed in moving from the theoretical
conception to the empirical application. It simply is not possible to use
industry of employment to establish sector of employment with any degree
of certainty.
The appropriate solution is to model sector of employment as unknown
a priori and to let the estimation technique determine the sector of
employment. The appropriate statistical technique is described in Dickens
and Lang (1985a) --"endogenousswitching with unknown regimes.t' To
estimate this model the research specifies two or more equations which
describe the wage determination process in each sector as a function of
human capital and other variables. The researcher also specifies an
equation describing the process by which people are assigned to the two
sectors as a function of human capital and ascriptive criteria. The model
is estimated by maximum likelihood. In effect, the model assigns a
probability of being in each sector to each person on the basis of
ascriptive and human capital variables. Simultaneously, it estimates the
return to human capital and other variables in each sector. This
"endogenous switching model with unknown regimes" stands at the opposite
end of the spectrum from the "exogenous switching models with known
regimes" which have been used in the dual economy literature. The latter20
assume that industry of employment provides complete information about
sector of employment while the former makes no use of industry information
to assign workers to sectors.(If one wished to compromise between the
two approaches, one could modify the technique developed by Dickens and
Lang to take account of industry information without assuming that sector
of employment is known perfectly.)
In sum, the segmented economy literature distinguishes itself from
the neoclassical model primarily by rejecting the assumption that wages
adjust to clear labor markets. As will be discussed below, there has been
a resurgence of interest in such models in neoclassical economics as
well. However, while both economists and sociologists have concerned
themselves with testing the segmented markets model by establishing
whether firm or industry characteristics enter a wage equation
significantly, this does not really address the issue of market clearing.
Moreover, the estimation techniques used in these "tests" are
inappropriate for the dual market model.
V. Testing for Queues
Since both the dual labor market and dual economy models
differentiate themselves from the neoclassical model by rejecting the
existence of market clearing, the most direct way to distinguish between
segmented market models and the standard neoclassical model is to test for
the existence of queues.The most straightforward manner in which to consider whether or not
there are queues for jobs is to examine the effect of inter-industry wage
differentials on quit rates. If workers in high wage industries are, in
fact, receiving rents, we would expect them to have lower quit rates.
This prediction is confirmed by a number of studies. However,
interpretation of this result is hindered by an inadequate theory of why
quits occur. Moreover, if high ability workers tend to invest more
heavily in firm specific capital, they will simultaneously have higher
wages and lower quit rates.
Farber (1983) presents the most sophisticated approach to studying
queues in his examination of queues for union jobs. He points out that it
is necessary to model the process whereby individuals are allocated to
each sector. Allocation is the outcome of two decisions. First, workers
must decide whether or not to seek union employment. Since the nonunion
sector is assumed to be competitive, those workers who desire nonunion
jobs at the going wage rate enter the nonunion sector. However, not all
workers who desire union jobs obtain them. Instead, the union wage
premium results in a queue (excess supply of workers) for union jobs.
Workers only obtain union jobs if an employer chooses them from the
queue. Thus the probability of being allocated to the union sector is the
probability of wanting a union job multiplied by the probability of
obtaining a union job given that the worker desires one. If there is not
an excess supply of labor for union jobs, the latter probability is one,
and the model reduces to one in which only the probability of wanting a
union job equation needs to be estimated. Thus, the no queue model is22
nested in the queue model, and it is possible to test for the existence of
queues. Farber's work is facilitated by the presence of a measure of
whether or not the workers desire union jobs.*
Dickens and Lang (1985a,b, 1986), use a somewhat different approach
in the context of a dual labor market model. They point out that if
workers were free to choose their sector of employment, they would tend to
enter the sector in which their earnings, adjusted for the value of
nonwage characteristics of employment, were highest. Using the endogenous
switching model with unknown regimes discussed above, they find that for
an equal wage differential between the sectors, nonwhites are more likely
to be employed in the secondary sector. There are two possible
conclusions -- eithernonwhites place a lower value on the nonwage
characteristics of the primary sector or nonwhites find it more difficult
to obtain primary employment. Auxiliary evidence** tends to contradict
the first conclusion. Therefore, it appears that nonwhites face nonprice
discrimination which implies the absence of market clearing.
VI.Notesfor A Neoclassical Model of Labor Market Stratification
We have presented evidence in support of the view that there is an
excess supply of labor for certain types of jobs. Since one of the major
departures of segmented market theory from earlier neoclassical theory is
the existence of queues, it is important to consider the extent to which
queues are compatible with more recent developments in neoclassical
theory. The major conclusion of this section will be that recent
neoclassical theorists have produced the elements of a model which, on23
those topics which have traditionally concerned neoclassical economists,
captures the major departures of dual labor market theory from
neoclassical theory. In addition, this theory helps clarify the relation
between dual economy theory and dual labor market theory. Moreover, there
is considerable convergence between the neoclassical and sociological
models. The major difference is that, in the recent neoclassical theory,
nonmeritocratic stratification can occur even when all markets are
competitive.
For the last decade, some of the most important work in economics has
concerned itself with developing a microeconomic foundation for
macroeconomics. Within economics there has been a split between a
microeconomic model which assumes general equilibrium with market clearing
and a Keynesian macroeconomic model which many would argue is based on the
failure of market clearing. Two schools of thought have arisen in
response to this dichotomy. One of these has attempted to explain
macroeconomic phenomena in terms of a market clearing model, and the other
has attempted to develop microeconomic models to explain the absence of
market clearing.*
The latter school has developed a number of related models which fall
under the general rubric of efficiency wage models. In order to describe
efficiency wage models, it is easiest to make the simplifying assumption
that all workers and jobs are homogeneous (though this assumption is not
necessary to the models). In this model, each firm chooses the amount of
labor it employs in order to maximize profits. In the standard model, the
derivative of profits with respect to the wage is just the negative of the24
amount of labor employed. In other words, as wages increase, profits
fall. Therefore, the firm would like to set the wage as low as possible,
and it would never pay more than the minimum necessary to obtain the
quantity (and in a more general model, quality) of workers it desires.
Under the various efficiency wage models, raising wages can increase
profits. In most efficiency wage models this results from the fact that
output depends on the wage. As a consequence, in efficiency wage models,
firms do not necessarily choose the lowest possible wage; instead they
choose the wage which maximizes their profits. If the wage which
maximizes profits is above the market clearing wage, some workers will be
unemployed. In the standard model, unemployed workers would bid down any
wages above the market clearing level. However, in efficiency wage
models, since the wage has been chosen to maximize profits, lowering the
wage would actually lower profits. Consequently, there can be an excess
supply of labor.
Katz (1986) and Yellen (1984) provide extensive reviews of the
various efficiency wage models. We provide only a brief summary here. In
most efficiency wage models, output is assumed to depend on the wage and
not just on the quantity of labor employed as in more standard models.
Wages may affect output in a number of ways -- throughworker morale
(Solow, 1979a; Akerlof, 1982), through differences in the quality of
workers hired that are unobservable by the firm (Weiss, 1980), by reducing
quits, or by reducing shirking, stealing and cheating (Bowles, 1985;
Calvo, 1979; Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984; Stoft, 1982). In the models in
which higher wages reduce the probability of workers' cheating, shirking25
or quitting, the higher wage makes it costly for workers to lose their
jobs and thus provides a disincentive to behavior which might cause them
to be fired. In the morale models the higher wage might be thought of as
changing workers' preferences, but in the other models, preferences are
clearly constant, and workers change their behavior only because
incentives have been modified. The latter fit more easily into the
neoclassical paradigm of profit maximizing firms and utility maximizing
workers with constant preferences.
The motivations for paying high wages are similar to those found in
the segmented economy literature. However, it should be noted that none
of the models above relies on the existence of monopoly rents or "ability
to pay" that is central to the segmented economy literature. Instead, in
most efficiency wage models, the queues exist despite pure competition in
the product market. One version of the efficiency wage model, however, is
quite close to the most prevalent model in the dual economy literature.
Dickens (1986) argues that firms may pay higher wages in order to deter
workers from taking collective action such as forming a union. The need
to pay union-deterring wages is greatest when the potential rents captured
by the union are large either due to the firm's monopoly power in the
product market or due to the presence of fixed capital.
Although the efficiency wage models were developed to explain what
many economists perceive as the failure of the wage to adjust to clear the
labor market, they have obvious application to the development of a formal
neoclassical model of labor market segmentation. If the costs of
monitoring workers or the costs of worker malfeasance differ among26
industries, the wage levels which maximize profits will differ among
industries. If there is a set of firms which pay efficiency wages and a
set of firms which do not pay efficiency wages, then there will be two
sectors of the labor market. One will have high wages and an excess
supply of labor. The other will have low wages and behave according to
the standard competitive model. Such models are developed informally in
Dickens and Lang (1984) and Yellen (1984) and formally in Jones (1985) and
Bulow and Summers (1986).
The above discussion suggests a clear relation between the dual
economy and dual labor market classifications. The primary sector
consists of all jobs for which there is structural and equilibrium excess
supply even in equilibrium. Thus the queues are structural rather than
transitory. Jobs in the monopoly or core sector tend to be in the primary
sector because, in general, the existence of a large amount of fixed
capital or monopoly rents is conducive to the formation of a union. In
addition, some versions of the efficiency wage model imply that firms
which earn rents will pay high wages because workers' conceptions of fair
pay depends on the ability of firms to pay. Also such firms may pay high
wages to deter unionization since the potential gains from unionization
are greater in the presence of rents. Furthermore, monopoly sector firms
tend to have high capital/labor ratios. Many efficiency wage models
suggest that firms with high capital/labor ratios will pay high wages
since the need to avoid shirking, abseenteeism and quits is greatest in
the presence of large quantities of fixed capital. Thus monopoly sector
firms tend to pay efficiency or union-deterring wages. However, some27
firms which are not in the monopoly sector may find it beneficial to pay
efficiency wages which exceed market clearing levels to at least some of
their workers. Consequently, the primary labor market is considerably
more extensive than the monopoly sector.
Unfortunately, the efficiency wage model described above does not
provide a completely satisfactory neoclassical model of dual labor
markets. The major difficulty is that it suggests that unemployment
consists of people queuing for jobs in the primary labor market. Since
primary jobs tend to be stable, this contradicts evidence that much
unemployment consists of frequent long spells of unemployment interrupted
by short spells of employment and certainly conflicts with a perspective
designed to explain persistent poverty and unemployment among certain
disadvantaged groups.
The answer to this problem lies in a model which is described
informally in Piore (1975) and developed independently in a neoclassical
model of contestable markets under uncertainty by Appelbaum and Lim
(1985). In that model, there is uncertain demand for industry output.
Output may be produced using either of two technologies, a low
variable-cost/high fixed-cost technology which requires investment prior
to the realization of the state of demand or a high variable-cost/low
fixed-cost technology which does not require prior investment. Firms will
invest in the low variable-cost technology in order to satisfy relatively
certain demand. When demand is high, they will produce additional output
using the high variable-cost technology. The proportion of demand which
is satisfied using the low variable-cost technology will depend on the28
relative costs of the two technologies, the cost of storing the good and
on the variability of demand. If demand is perfectly stable or if the high
variable-cost technology is much more expensive than the low variable-cost
technology and the good is storable, all output will be produced using the
low variable-cost technology. On the other hand, if demand is highly
unstable, the good is not storable and the cost difference is small,
almost all demand will be produced using the high variable-cost
technology. In most industries some output will be produced using the low
variable-cost technology, but this output will be supplemented in boom
periods through the use of the high variable-cost technology.
It is worth noting that it is possible that high demand/ high
variable-cost technology production may take place in the same firms that
also use the low variable-cost technology, or in firms that "specialize"
in high variable-cost technology. For example, consider an old-fashioned
luncheonette which sells ice cream. For the luncheonette the marginal
cost of supplying the relatively stable day to day demand for ice cream is
low. However, every once in a while, there is an unusually hot day and
the demand for ice cream increases. The increased demand for ice cream
might be accommodated by setting up an additional stand outside the
luncheonette or push cart operators who sell hot chestnuts in the winter
might rapidly convert their carts to handle ice cream. Factors such as
the nature of the technology and access to short term labor markets and
ice cream suppliers would determine whether one or both of these solutions
would be used.29
TheAppelbaum/Lim contestable markets model provides a very different
model of economic dualism than the one based on a division of firms into
those in the monopoly and competitive sectors. Moreover, as Piore (1975)
argued, it is clear that not only can different firms within an industry
use different technologies, but even within firms, different technologies
may be used to produce the same output.
It is easy to see why primary sector jobs would tend to be located in
firms using low variable-cost technologies. As Bulow and Summers (1986)
point out, when jobs become unstable, the wage required to deter cheating
increases since workers expect to receive that wage over a shorter period
of time. When the efficiency wage required to avoid worker malfeasance
becomes sufficiently large, firms will prefer to use other means such as
direct monitoring of workers' behavior. Thus firms facing stable demand
will tend to pay efficiency wages while firms facing unstable demand will
tend to use direct monitoring. This link between sector and method of
worker regulation is reminiscent of Edwards (1979).
Of course, the link between stable demand and primary labor market
jobs will not be perfect. In some stable jobs, the cost of direct
monitoring will be sufficiently low that it will be preferable to paying
efficiency wages, while, in some unstable jobs, the cost of monitoring may
be sufficiently high to justify the use of efficiency wages despite the
instability. Thus while job stability, the use of low variable-cost
technology and high wages will tend to be linked, none of the pairwise
correlations will be perfect.30
In addition, economic theory suggests that a number of other factors
are likely to be correlated with job stability, including investment in
on-the-job training and the use of pensions and job ladders. Thus there
are a number of job characteristics which we would expect to be
correlated.
In this way, the neoclassical approach to dual labor market theory
casts light on the usefulness of factor-analytic approaches to testing the
model. A number of papers (Buchele, 1976; Gordon, 1971; Hodson & Kaufman,
1981; Horan, Tolbert & Beck, 1981; Kaufman, Hodson & Fligstein, 1981;
Oster, 1979; Tolbert, Horan & Beck, 1980) have interpreted dual economy
theory or dual labor market theory as maintaining that all jobs can be
classified on the basis of a single bimodal factor. They have either
attempted to test these models by techniques such as factor analyzing job
or industry characteristics to see whether they can be classified using a
single bimodally distributed factor, or have criticized dual economy
theory for not recognizing the greater dimensionality of segmentation
(Kalleberg, Wallace & Althauser, 1981; Wallace & Kalleberg, 1981). In the
light of the neoclassical model, this approach is generally misguided.
Nothing in the model suggests that a single factor should be sufficient to
classify jobs. It does suggest that one important factor should link
wages, stability and technology.
However, dual labor market theory does not imply that the dual labor
market is the only basis on which jobs can be classified. For instance,
if in the list of job characteristics we were to include outdoor work in
winter,western region, commuting distance, commuting method, whether or31
not most workers in the firm were born in the state or unionized, a factor
analysis would probably uncover an additional factor which might be termed
"sun belt." The presence of this second factor would in no way disprove
dual labor market theory. The model implies that certain characteristics
should be correlated not that no other characteristics are.
One of the weaknesses of dual labor market theory has been that it
has generally been presented as a classification scheme designed to
describe certain empirical regularities. Without an underlying
theoretical base, it is difficult to maintain that one classification
scheme is superior to another. Thus, if a study finds that the variation
in wages that can be explained by a four or sixteen or sixty-four sector
model is significantly greater than that which can be achieved with a two
sector model, it is tempting to conclude that the dual labor market model
has been rejected. Drawing this conclusion is inappropriate for two
reasons -- first,because dual labor market theory does not suggest that
the only determinant of wages is sector of employment and, secondly,
because dual labor market theory should not be regarded principally as a
classification system.
VII. Some Concluding Remarks
Although dual labor market theory has been largely atheoretical, the
neoclassical model we sketched in the last section is not the first
attempt to provide it with a theoretical underpinning. In fact, we
perceive that model as being a relatively faithful neoclassical rendering
of ideas presented by Doeringer and Piore (1971) and Piore (1975,32
1980a&b). The fact that it is possible to present a neoclassical version
of these ideas suggests that they were never all that incompatible with
neoclassical economics.
Similarly, we believe that dual economy theory should also be
perceived as being compatible with neoclassical economics. The
sociological work in this area addresses the problems of eliciting worker
effort that, from a different perspective, are the concern of efficiency
wage and agency (Becker & Stigler, 1974; Lazear, 1979, 1981) models in
economics. There is clear potential for cross-fertilization of the
economic and organizational (e.g. Baron & Bielby 1980, 1982, 1984;
Stolzenberg, 1978) perspectives. From an economic perspective, the
sociological literature has paid undue attention to the role of monopoly
rents and insufficient to other economic conditions which foster or
inhibit the growth of different administrative mechanisms.
Nevertheless, in the light of our analysis, we cannot avoid a certain
disappointment that sociologists have not concerned themselves more with
the most significant departure of dual labor market theory from
neoclassical economics -- theattempt to incorporate social-psychological
feedback into the system. Whether a model which dropped the assumption of
perfect rationality to incorporate the Piagetian concepts of Piore (1980b)
or a model which allowed tastes to be endogenous would still be
neoclassical is largely a matter of definition. We are, however, inclined
to agree with Piore (1974) that exogeneity of tastes and perfect
rationality are essential to the neoclassical model and that dropping
these assumptions would give rise to a model which differed significantlyfrom existing theory. In neoclassical economics, the individual is a
completely formed entity from birth. His or her utility function is
exogenous to the economic system, and since all individuals are fully
rational with unlimited cognitive capacity, cognition is independent of
the organization of work. It is in this area that the dual labor market
model presents the greatest challenge to neoclassical economics.
Moreover, sociologists have more training and experience with this
type of model. Perhaps sociologists have neglected dual labor market
theory's tentative steps towards integrating these sociological notions
with labor market theory because of the weakness of the economists'
efforts in this direction. We expect that this is one direction of
inquiry in which sociologists could make substantial contributions to
theories of labor markets.3 L1
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*Weare grateful to Sam Gilmore, Shulamit Kahn, Ken Small, David
Smith and Gary Thom for helpful comments and criticisms and to the
National Science Foundation for research support under grant nuniber
SES8606139. Any errors of fact or interpretation are, of course,
entirely our responsibility.
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*Throughoutthis paper we use the following nomenclature. We use
"dual or segmented labor markets" when we refer to the economic
literature, "dual or segmented economy" when we refer to the
sociological literature and "dual or segmented markets" when we refer
to both literatures simultaneously. Neoclassical economists should be
viewed as distinct from the Marxists and institutionalists who,
together, comprise the schools of economic thought from which dual
labor market theory developed.
page 2
*Thissection is based heavily on Kahn and Lang (1986). A related
analysis of the market for occupational safety is described in Kahn
(1985).
page 5
*Moreformally, the firm chooses the number of workers to hire and




where without loss of generality the price of output has been
normalized to equal 1, f is the production function net of any capital
costs, L is the number of workers hired, E is their level of
education, w is the wage they receive and u is a parameter measuring
the contribution of education to productivity in the firm.
Similarly, workers choose their level of education in order to
maximize their appropriately discounted lifetime earnings net of
education costs
(2) net earnings —w(E)-c(E,e)
where c is the appropriately amortized cost of education and e
represents the ease of obtaining schooling for the individual.
It can be shown that the firm's demand depends on u and the slope
of the HWE (the w function) and, that similarly, the level of
education chosen by the worker depends on e and the slope of the HWE:
(3) Ed Ed(w. ,u)
(4) E5 —E5(w',e)
where superscripts denote supply and demand, and w', the slope of the
HWE, serves the role of price in standard supply or demand equations.36
The competitive market matches workers with high values of e with
firms with high values of u. This matching process can be described
by a function relating e to U:
(5) e f(u) f'>O.
To derive the HWE, we proceed as follows -- first,solve (3) and
(4) for u and e as functions of w' and E:
(6) e —e(w',E)
(7) u u(w' ,E)
The next step is to substitute (6) and (7) into (5) to obtain
(8) e(w' ,E) f(u(w' ,E))
and then solve for w' as a function of E
(9) w' w'(E).
Finally, (9) can be integrated to obtain the hedonic wage equation
(10) w —w(E).37
page 6
*Thefact that the wage equation can be interpreted as the
equilibrium outcome of the interaction of supply and demand does not
mean that this fact was clearly recognized in the seminal work of
Becker (1971) and Mincer (1974). To the extent that the development
of the human capital model ignored demand factors, the sociological
criticism of the theoretical work is justified.
page 6
**Monopsonyrefers to a market with only one buyer. In a labor
market a monopsony exists when one firm or a group of firms acting
together are the sole source of employment for a particular group of
workers.
page 15
*Moreformally, from equation (9), w' is a function of E. Therefore,
it is possible to substitute for w' in the demand equation and solve
for E as a function of e. Kahn and Lang (1986) refer to this as the
quasi-reduced form demand equation. Having derived E as a function of
e, it is possible to substitute for E in the HWE and derive w as a
function of e. By a similar process, it is possible to express the
wage solely in terms of firm characteristics.
page 22
*Nevertheless,Abowd and Farber (1982) demonstrate that it is
possible to test for the existence of queues even in the absence of
such a measure.38
page 22
**Blacksare more likely to support unions in representation
elections (Farber & Saks, 1980; Dickens, 1983), are less likely to
quit a job (Viscusi, 1979) and have greater demand for occupational
safety than equivalent whites (Kahn, 1983). Primary jobs are
generally believed to be more heavily unionized, provide more stable
employment and to be safer than secondary jobs. Thus, it is doubtful
that blacks prefer the nonpecuniary features of secondary employment
to a greater extent than whites.
page 23
*SeeSolow (l979b) for a discussion of this debate.39
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